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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involved the criminal prosecution and
conviction of Dennis A. Hunter for the charge of assault
with a deadly weapon, in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DIS POSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
A complaint was filed in the District Court of
Summit County on November 2, 19~6, by Ted London,
a member of the Utah Highway Patrol, charging Dennis A.
Hunter with the crime of assault with a deadly weapon.
Trial was held in the District Court of Salt Lake County
on the 8th day of December, 1966. After a jury trial
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the appellant, Mr. Hunter, was found guilty of assault
with a deadly weapon. On the 30th day of December,
1966, the appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate
term of imprisonment not to exceed five years in accordance with§ 76-7-6, Utah Code Anno. (1953).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant, Dennis A. Hunter, respectfully
submits that his criminal conviction of assault with a
deadly weapon should be reversed and that a new trial
of the charges against him be ordered.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 23, 1966, the appellant, Dennis A. Hunter,
and one Steve Clark, were involved in a high-speed
automobile chase with pursuing Utah Highway Patrolmen.
As the chase progressed up Echo Canyon, the two automobiles closed to within one or two car lengths of one
another. At this point, one of the patrolmen leaned out
of his car window and made as if to fire his pistol at
the appellant and his companion (T. 38, 55 and 56}. As
the appellant and his companion dropped lower in their
seats to avoid being struck by the presumed pistol fire,
the automobiles separated to a distance greater than
a hundred feet (T. 5 6). At this point, the appellant leaned
out of his window and fired shots in the general direction
of the pursuing patrol car (T. 39 and 56).
At the appellant's trial, no evidence was produced
to show that any of appellant's pistol shots struck anywhere near the automobile in which the pursuing patrolmen were riding. In fact, the chief witness for the State
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testified that he did not notice any results of the appellant'
firing (T • 4 8) .
The State further failed to produce any direct proof
of the intentment with which the appellant acted while
firing his pistol, save the fact that the gun was pointed
in a general direction toward the patrolmen. All of this
occurring while both automobiles were engaged in extensive evasive maneuvers and while both automobiles
were some distance from one another.
At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence,
counsel for the appellant requested an instruction on the
includability of the lesser offense of wimple assault
within the charge of assault with a deadly weapon
(R. 17 and 21). The lower Court rejected this requested
instruction stating that it felt that the issue at hand was
either assault with a deadly weapon or nothing (T. 67).
Further statements by the Court indicate that there
might have been some confusion as to the nature of a
criminal assault. The Court apparently took the position
that an assault would be criminal only if the assaulting
party clearly intended to kill or physically injure a party
CT. 6 7 and 6 8}. According to the Court, any other form
of assault would not be criminal in nature, but would
merely be a civil matter {T. 68}. To this, counsel for
the appellant took due exception (T. 67, 68 and 75).
Following an interrupted deliberation by the jury,
(T. 76) a verdict of guilty of the charge of assault with
a deadly weapon was returned against the appellant.
It is from this conviction the appellant now takes this
appeal.
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRIEVOUS AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING TO GRANT APPELLANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON THE INCLUDABILITY OF THE
LESSER OFFENSE or SIMPLE ASSAULT WITHIN THE CHARGE
OF ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON.
There are three defined elements of the offense
of assault with a deadly weapon with which the appellant
in this case is charged. The Utah Supreme Court in the
ca.se of State v. Bc:rkas, 91Utah574, 580, 65 P.2d 1130
(193 7) has defined these elements as being:
(1) An
assault; (2) use of a deadly weapon; (3) an intent to do
bodily harm.
11

11

Implicit within the description of assault with a
deadly weapon is t~e rule of law that so-called simple
assault is a nec:_essary and included lesser offense
within the greater offense. In the Barkas case, the Utah
Supreme Court fully accepted this rule of law and stated
that:
There can be no doubt that a charge of assault
with intent to do bodily harm, includes also
simple assault, because that assault must be
proved as a necessary element of the greater
offense. (Emphasis added.)
See also the case of People v. Bruce, 40 Cal. Rptr. 877
891 (D.C. Cal. App., 1964); "[S]imple assault ••• is
a necessarily included offense within the charge of force
likely to produce great bodily harm."
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By elevating simple assault to the stature of a
"necessary element" of the offense of assault with a
deadly weapon, the Utah Court has likewise imposed
the requirement that an instruction on this included offense
must be given to the jury. The result of this rule of law
therefore being that a trial court's failure to present the
jury with such an instruction, with such an alternative
verdict, is generally considered to be reversible error.
The Court in the case of State v. Hymas, 64 Utah 2 85,
286, 230 Pac. 349 (1924}, pointed out that "where the
accused is charged with a greater offense, he is nevertheless entitled to an instruction that the jury may convict
him of a lesser offense . . . . " And, in the Barkas
case, the Court at page 580 states that:
Since "simple assault" is a necessary element
of the offense charged or any offense included
therein, . . . it was error on the part of the
trial court to refuse to submit that possible
verdict to the jury .
By refusing or failing to give such instruction, such
an alternative, the trial judge effectively usurps the factfinding duties of the jury. This Court has long recognized
the danger inherent in such usurpation by a trial judge
and has indicated its reluctance to uphold such actions.
This marked reluctance was clearly indicated in the opinion
in the Hymas case at page 287 where the Court states
that:
It is, however, always a delicate matter for a

trial court to withhold from the jury the right to
find the accused guilty of a lesser or included
offense, and determine the question of the
state of evidence as a matter of law.
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The danger that arises by such a refusal to give
an instruction on lesser included offenses is clearly
demonstrated in the situation where the evidence is of a
nature that points to some degree of guilt on the defendant's
part. Jf the jury has no choice save that of acquittal or
conviction on the greater offense, it is then placed
squarely on the horns of a dilemma. For to acquit the
defendant is to release a man the jury feels is guilty, yet
to convict him of the greater offense is to find him
guilty of a charge greater in degree than that the jury
feels is warranted by the evidence. The refusal by
che Court to give the jury a third alternative of a lesser
offense then destroys the jury's right and power to pass
judgment on the evidence. But more than this, the
refusal to give this instruction weakens dangerously the
rightful presumption of innocence given to an accused and
reduces the burden of proof placed on the State.
This fact-finding role of the jury becomes
critical when it is realized that in order to convict a person
accused with assault with a deadly weapon, the jury must,
as a matter of law, determine the intent with which the
accused acted. See State v. Barkas, supra. Likewise,
due to the nature of this offense the intent of the actor
generally must be inferred from the circumstances
surrounding his actions rather than by direct proof.
It becomes clear then, that the jury may determine as a
matter of fact that the intention that may be inferred
or derived from the avidence is too weak to sustain a
charge of assault with a deadly weapon. To remove such
determination from the jury by refusing to give an instructioi
on lesser included offenses is to deprive the fact-finders
of their most basic and important obligation and to
cast the trial judge in a role for which he is illsuited under our judicial system.
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That the foregoing line of reasoning applies to
the instant case is apparent from a review of the evidence
presented at the trial. In describing the alleged assault,
the State's witnesses testified that the firing of the pistol
by the appellant took place under extremely adverse
conditions. The appellant fired his shots while in an
automobile that was engaged in extensive and evasive
maneuvering at high speeds. (T. 38, 39, 56, and 57).
The distance between the appellant's automobile and that
of the State trooper's was, in the words of the witness
Denos, "a hundred feet or better." (T. 56) It is
therefore no wonder that the State's witnesses conceded
that not only were they and their automobile not struck
by any of these shots, but, and more importantly, the
appellant's shots were apparently so wide of the mark
that the witnesses had no idea of where these shots
went. (T. 48) In fact, on cross-examination, trooper
London fin'ally admftted that, "All I saw, that the gun
was pointed in my direction." (T. 48)
Added to these facts is the additional point that
in order for the ap)Cellant to aim the pistol at the
complJining party, trooper London (R. 2), it was
necessary for the appellant, who was in the right-hand
side of the fleeing automobile, (T. 39 and 56) to twist
his body around and fire with his left hand across his
body at an acute angle toward trooper London who was
in the left-hand side of the pursuing automobile. (T. 36)
The State completely failed to offer any direct
evidence of, or further circumstantial evidence to portray
the specific intent with which the appellant acted.
This dearth of evidence coupled with the physical
conditions as established by the State's witnesses
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completely left the questions of intent open for decision
by the jury. That this evidentiary condition requires
jury determination as to the degree of the offense
committed was recognized in the case of Barnishel v.
Peo~, 347 P.2d 915, 918 (Colo., 1959):
Where there is no evidence of the specific intent
required to determine the defendant guilty of the
precise offense charged in the information, or
the evidence, as in this case, might be insufficient
to remove the reasonable doubt which might be in
the minds of the jury as to the intent, under the
same evidence the defendant might be found
guilty of simple assault.
The jury in the instant case was not given the
opportunity to decide the issue of reasonable doubt and
its relationship to the question of the intent of the appellant
The trial court rejected the instructions on lesser and
included offenses requested by appellant's counsel.
(T. 6 7) (It should also be noted that it is clear that the
status of this evidence raised serious doubts and
questions in the jurors' minds. At one point during its
deliberation, the jury returned with a verdict with which
not all of the jurors agreed. The foreman indicated that
the jury had reached an impasse in its deliberations.
(T. 76) Subsequent to the urgings by the trial court, the
jury, after three hours of deliberation, returned a verdict
of guilty. (T. 78))
In refusing the requested instruction, the lower
Court gave a confusing interpretation to the law of
assault with a deadly weapon. At page 67 of the
official transcript, the Court states that "the evidence
shows that a gun was loaded . . . . It's either with a
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deac1ly weapon or noLhing under this evidence." This
pC1sition is contrary to the law as pointed out in the
R8rk21~;.cc1se at page 579 of the opinion:
This, [action of assault] if done with the
intention of frightening, or intimidating or
interfering with Cordova would constitute a
technical or simple assault, which is a
threat or attempt to interfere with one's
sense or feeling of physical security and
put one in fear for his safety.
See also the contradictory position taken by the lower
Court on lines 16, 17, 18 and 19 at page 48 of the
official transcript.
The stcte of this evidence raised a sufficient
question as to the intent with which the appellant acted.
This was a matter for the jury and not the Court to decide.
It is upon this wrongful refusal by the lower Court to
grant the requested instruction on the lesser included
offense of simple assault that this appeal is taken.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court
committed grievous and reversible error in refusing to
grant appellant's request for an instruction on the inclusio
of the offense of simple assault in the charge of assault
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with a deadly weapon and that appellant's conviction
should, therefore, be reversed and a new trial ordered.

Rer~ctfully
1
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